
The Occupy London protests are still going strong with the protesters having seized an empty building belonging to UBS to create an “Ideas Bank”. Nice idea. The Occupy protests do have an important message, so it is unfortunate that so far, its main victim has been accidental – the Church of England, which descended into confusion over whether any of the protesters had valid points to make, and if so, did it justify the fact that they were making it difficult to get to the St Paul’s Cathedral gift and coffee shop?
It hasn’t helped that the protesters’ aims have been slightly vague so far. According to their website, they are “in agreement that the current system is undemocratic and unjust.” More specific grievances are listed under their “initial statement”, and among other things include:
“We refuse to pay for the banks’ crisis.
We want regulators to be genuinely independent of the industries they regulate.”
Worry about lobbying is a valid concern. It is difficult to know for certain how much lobbying goes on by different interest groups, and how effective they are. Theoretically, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with different interest groups (including firms) talking to politicians and regulators about their views on different policies. But it is a concern if different members of society are better able to access and influence compared to others. And it is a fairly safe assumption that some groups (particularly large companies) have a lot of resources to throw at talking to politicians and regulators, even going as far as funding Government special advisers, as was apparently the case in the Adam Werrity affair.
How do you solve the lobbying problem? One option is to go down the regulatory rules route, for example, having register of lobbying organisations and making sure that there is transparency around meetings that go on between politicians and lobbyists. But it’s pretty difficult to go round policing who’s meeting who and what people say all the time – what do you do about informal meetings between people who know each other in a social context? News of the World had a go at policing what people say (albeit for slightly different reasons), and look where it got them.
So what about turning to that amazing process by which private firms are turned into enterprises that work for the social good: competition.
Ah the magical alchemy of competition, whereby firms compete for consumers by providing good, value-for-money products and services. (Caveat: like all magical spells, competition has the potential to go wrong if there are other problems in the market. The classic example is firms competing to reduce prices by skimping on health and safety, or environmental protection. The answer, of course, is not to get rid of competition altogether, but to have health and safety requirements, and ensure there are incentives not to pollute, like pollution taxes. Competition, like magic in the hands of an untrained wizard, doesn’t always deliver what you expect if you don’t properly understand the market and different firms’ incentives. I’m rather warming to this competition/magic spell metaphor. It may warrant a future blog post.)
But, I hear you cry, you are simply an economist who has ignored the politics of the whole thing. You’ve blabbed on about free markets (I didn’t actually) and competition until we thought you were Alan Greenspan, and completely ignored the fact that you were trying to solve the problem of lobbying by big corporations.
Patience. I was just getting to that. (Am I sounding too smug? The competition/magic metaphor may be going to my head. I must remember that being an economist does not actually make me a wise old sorcerer). In a competitive market, with many different firms, it is far more difficult for firms to coordinate – this makes it trickier to lobby as one large industry body. It also makes it more difficult to lobby when firms don’t have huge resources to throw at it.
A recent research paper shows that the level of competition in a country’s financial sector has a significant impact on politicians’ ability to force reforms related to financial regulation through. The paper, by Susie Lee and Ingmar Schumacher, shows that financial instability tends to be followed, as one might expect, by more regulation: but significantly, this increase in regulation is less likely to happen in countries with low levels of competition and strong lobbying.
Now, of course, big firms will probably lobby against competition reforms. That’s where Occupy London could come in with some additional public pressure to get reforms through more quickly. It’s a concrete idea to campaign on, it could contribute to solving the problem, and crucially, just like any good lobbyist, it speaks in the same language of government and regulators in the UK, surely none of whom could possibly argue that more competition is a bad thing – especially in the wake of reports such as the Independent Commission on Banking, which concluded that there are long-standing competition issues in UK retail banking, with high levels of market concentration, made worse by events since the financial crisis, such as bank mergers. Helpfully, the report also sets out ways of increasing competition, including divestiture of assets and making increasing transparency and switching.
Occupy London: what more could you want?
The paper by Susie Lee and Ingmar Schumacher , “When does financial sector (in)stability induce financial reforms?”, is here.
High Pay Commission’s transparency blind spot
Could we be going back to this?! Image via Wikipedia
“By 2035 the top 0.1% will take home 14% of the national income. Equivalent to that seen in Victorian England.” So proclaims the final report of the High Pay Commission, which was set up to look at the inequality in pay in the UK and what to do about it. They had to do a bit of extrapolating at both ends to come up with this conclusion, as they only had data from 1913 to 2007, and the Victorian era ended in 1901. But subsequent eras such as the Edwardian era and World War 1 have less of a whiff of the workhouse and Oliver Twist about them, so you can see why the Commission were keen to stretch the data out a bit.
The pedant in me is slightly annoyed by this example of engineering, the lack of clarity on whether they have taken tax into account or not, and the mis-spelling of “Dan Ariely” as “Dan Ariel”. But these are, perhaps, relatively minor quibbles. There is plenty of other data out there which points to the fact that those at the top are seeing their pay grow at a faster rate than those lower down. And anyway, the Commission’s data engineering allowed me to start my blog post with a gratifyingly dramatic quote, so I won’t complain too much.
The report contains some very interesting ideas and possible solutions, including placing employees on remuneration committees, shareholder voting on remuneration arrangements for up to three years ahead, and publicly advertising non-executive positions. But the report provides less credible justification for some measures, which I put down to two reasons. Firstly, it does not contain a thorough enough analysis of why there is a growing gap in pay, what has or hasn’t worked in past, and what this means for what needs to be done, including a proper discussion of different options. For example, there is no discussion of the idea that middle-skill jobs are becoming less important with improvements in technology, and all the ramifications this has for the salary that people lower down in organisations can demand. Secondly, as with so many policy thinkers, there is a tendency to idolise transparency, without considering what type of transparency is needed and why.
This perhaps partly explains how the commission have ended up with the recommendation to “publish the top ten executive pay packages outside the boardroom”. Clearly, there is an apparent contradiction here with one of the report’s explanation for rises in executive pay, the ratchet effect, whereby benchmarking of executive salaries leads companies to continually attempt to pay above average. How do we know that publishing the top ten executive pay packages outside the boardroom won’t lead to the same result, but with a slightly larger group at the top heading off into the stratosphere instead? The report does not provide any reasoning to explain why its other recommendations might outweigh this effect.
What would happen, I wonder, if there was increased transparency all the way down an organisation? At specific skill levels, this might reduce discrepancies in pay, perhaps with some ratcheting up in the short-term for those who were previously under-paid. But the ratcheting could not continue over the long-term, at all skill levels, without seriously affecting the competitiveness of a firm. No doubt, there would be upward pressure on pay in some areas, but these would tend to be areas where there is high demand for certain types of skills, relative to supply. These areas wouldn’t necessarily be at executive board level: they could be for researchers with specialist knowledge, economists maybe (I think hopefully).
Only being a five minute economist, I don’t have the time to fully research this question. But please do let me know if you have seen any interesting research on the effects of different types of pay transparency measures in firms.